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Among the difficulties besetting the courts today is lack of money.
In this respect, they share adversity with most public and charitable
institutions such as schools, universities, hospitals, parks and libraries.
But the fiscal dilemma of the courts is unique in certain respects.
They constitute an independent branch of government, critically neces-
sary to the balance of our constitutional system. Yet they are expected
to eschew the normal political process and, unlike other competitors
for public resources, are prohibited from cultivating their own con-
stituencies and utilizing lobbyists. Furthermore, the judicial systems
of most states are heavily dependent on local government for their
finance.' In these states, the courts must join the unhappy competi-
tion for the inadequate revenues of local property taxes.
While available fiscal support is limited, the judicial workload often
appears boundless. The squeeze, discernible everywhere, has reached
crisis proportions in some localities, resulting in substantial' backlogs,
frustrated litigants, and demoralized court staffs. Money alone will
not solve all of these problems; nevertheless, in many areas, particu-
larly the large cities, more money is plainly essential.
The task of providing the judiciary with adequate funding is first
one of problem-recognition and exhortation. This stage is now well
advanced.2 Next, it involves devising better methods for identifying
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1. U.S. ADvisoRY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE-LoCAL RtLk.
TIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 108 (1971).
2. Cf. CoMMITTEE ON THE STATE CONSTITUTION, NEW YORK STATE BAR Ass'N, INTERIM
REPORTS AND PROPOSALS (1966); CONSTITUTIONAL REvIsIoN COIMITrEE, CITIzENs UNION
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, POSITION PAPER No. 8, A STATE JUDICIAL BuDGEt (1967);
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the financial needs of the courts, presenting them clearly, getting the
required appropriations, and administering the funds in an intelligent
and responsible manner. This Comment will examine two currently
discussed methods of achieving an adequate and rational judicial
budget-the constitutional theory of inherent power and the admin-
istrative concept of unitary budgeting. We will suggest that it would
be unwise for advocates of judicial reform to rely solely on the im-
peratives of the former without also developing the practical and
political advantages of the latter.:
I. The Inherent Power Doctrine
The doctrine of inherent power runs essentially as follows: The
courts are a constitutionally created branch of government whose con-
tinued effective functioning is indispensable; performance of that
constitutional function is a responsibility committed to the courts;
this responsibility implies the authority necessary to carry it out;
therefore, the courts have the authority to raise money to sustain
their essential functions.4
The doctrine presents the alluring prospect of obtaining funds
through writs of mandamus, thus avoiding the bargaining and uncer-
tainty of the legislative process. Even its most extensive formulations,
however, have been somewhat ambiguous, never precisely defining
the needs to be covered. A court has inherent power, according to a
recent formulation, to determine what funds are reasonably necessary
for its efficient and effective operation, and to compel the executive
and legislative branches to provide such funds. 5 Such statements have
raised hopes that the doctrine can be used by courts to achieve fiscal
independence.
Substantial reliance upon the doctrine, however, may be shortsight-
GOVEAmNOR'S LOCAL AFFAIRS STUDY CoMIussIox, LOCAL GOVERNEMLNT IN COLORADO: FIND-
INGS AND RECO.MMENDATIONS 91 (1966); INSTTrUTE OF JUDICLAL ADMINISTIATIoN, TIlE SU-
r.RME JUDICIAL COURT AND THE SUPERIOR COURT OF TILE STATE OF ?UAINE (1971); SPEcIAL
COMITTEE ON TIlE CONSTITTIONAL CONVENTION, TIlE VSSOCIATION OF TlE lIAR OF TIlE
CITY OF NEW YORK, COURT STRUCTURE AND MANAGEIMENT (1967).
3. J. CARRIGAN, NATIONAL COLLEGE OF STATE TRIAL JUDGES OUTLINE ON INHlENT"
POWERS OF TRIAL COURTS TO PROVIDE NEEDED COURT PERSONNEL. FACILITIES AND EQIII'MEsNT
(4th rev. 1968), reprinted in INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STATIE AND LOCAL
FINANCING OF THE COURTS app. C (Tentative Report 1969).
4. Cf. A. VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF TIlE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PK S1E.%T-
DAY SIGNIFICANCE (1953).
5. Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 52, 274 A.2d 193, 197 (1971).
This is one of the most common formulations of the doctrinc. Sec also Judges for tle
Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne, 383 Mich. 10, 23, 172 N.W.2d 436. 441 (1969).
modified on rehearing, 386 Mich. 1, 190 N.V.2d 228 (1971).
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ed and unvise. As applied to date, it has been more bountiful in legal
rhetoric than in practical consequences. Most of the reported decisions
have involved marginal appropriations for ancillary personnel and
facilities rather than basic fiscal underwriting: Moreover, the disputes
have pitted the judicial system not against the executive and legis-
lative branches of state government, but rather against subdivisions
such as counties or municipalities7 Thus, the ultimate struggle has
been between state and local governments, not between the judicial
and legislative or executive branches. Indeed, some decisions have
relied at least partially on express or implied provisions of state con-
stitutions and statutes for their arguments. It seems safe to assume
that the decisions are often made with a fairly clear idea of legislative
sentiment on the issue of judicial funding. The courts thus avoid a
direct confrontation with their co-equal partner in state government
by requiring only local governments to fulfill their financial respon-
sibilities. In these decisions, the interests of the state executive and
legislature are affected neither strongly nor directly enough to move
them to the extraordinary action of opposing a judicial determination
of a specific case. Outflanked, the county or municipality succumbs.
In the minority of cases where the judiciary has proceeded against
the state legislative or executive branch in a direct contest, the issue
involved has always been specific, narrow, and relatively minor.8
6. Among the most significant uses of the doctrine of inherent power are in cases In-
volving the power of the court to set tie salaries of specified court employees; see
Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne, 383 Mich. 10, 172 N.W.2d
436 (1969), modified on rehearing, 386 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d 228 (1971) (11 probation
officers, eight law clerks, and a local court administrator); Bass v. County of Saline, 171
Neb. 538, 106 N.W.2d 860 (1960) (clerks in trial court); Wichita County v. Griffin, 281
S.W2d 253 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (court reporters).
7. In these cases, the action may be brought by a county or municipal court against
a county or municipal government, so that initially the adversaries are of equal stature.
The final decision in such a case, however, is almost always by the state's highest court
and is couched in terms of general judicial power such that the final contest is between
the county or municipal government and the authority of the decision is the state's
highest court. Thus, in Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 'a. 45, 274 A.2d
193 (1971), which began with the judges of the Philadelphia Court of Common Plcas
bringing mandamus against the mayor and city council of Philadelphia, the Pennsylvanila
supreme court in its decision broadly defined the issues as "(1) whether the Judilal
Branch of our Government has the inherent power to determine what fuinds are rea.
sonably necessary for its efficient and effective operation; and (2) if the Judiclary has
the power to determine what funds are reasonably necessary, does it then have the
power to compel the Executive and Legislative Branches to provide such funds .... "
442 Pa. at 47, 274 A.2d at 194 (emphasis in original). See, e.g., Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo.
35, 384 P.2d 738 (1963); Carlson v. State, 247 Ind. 631, 220 N.E.2d 532 (1966); judges
for the Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne, 383 Mich. 10, 23, 172 N.W.2d 436,
441 (1969), modified on rehearing, 386 Mich. 1, 190 NAV.2d 228 (1971); In re Bd. of
Comm'rs of Caldwell County, 4 N.C. App. 626, 167 S.E.2d 488 (1969); Commissloner's
Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
8. In re Appointment of Clerk of Court of Appeals, 297 S.W.2d 764 (Ky. 1957) (power
to appoint new clerk of court on incumbent's death); State ex rel. Schneider v. Cunning.
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Although the state's executive and legislative branches are directly
confronted, they are not challenged in any vital way. Acquiescence
to the doctrine of inherent power appears to follow from a considered
unwillingness to pursue the contest further, rather than any real dis-
ability to do so. There is a reluctance to jeopardize the tripartite
structure of government over a few dollars for a janitor's or stenog-
rapher's salary.
Expansion of the doctrine beyond this limited application would
raise significant constitutional and political difficulties. The only
available source of financial support for the courts is tax revenue
in the hands of other governmental units.0 The judiciary has no
power of the purse: For the courts autonomously to tax on a system-
atic basis would be dearly objectionable on constitutional grounds.
The taxing power is vested in the legislature, as checked by the veto
of the executive; 10 so is the power of appropriation.11 A judicial requi-
sition of funds from a taxing agency, such as a county or city, is in
ham, 39 Mont. 165, 101 P. 962 (1909) (whether the court's lonc stenographer should be
paid $150 or $200 per month); State ex rel. Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 26 Nev. 373. 377, 68 P.
689, 690 (1902) (new chairs and carpeting for the state supreme court's rooms); In rc
Janitor of Supreme Court, 35 Wisc. 410 (1874) (power to appoint janitor).
9. The courts' oldest method of raising revenue-charging fees for their services-is
now substantially unavailable and unavailing. Clearly this is so in criminal cases, where
most defendants are more or less without money. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The general principle which these cases
and their progeny establish is that the government cannot deny a defendant the means
necessary to defend himself because of his inability to pay the attendant costs. For a
general discussion of the theory see U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL's CoM7trrrEE ox PoVtR
AND TlE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUsrIcE, REPORT (1963).
In civil cases, although it might be constitutionally permissible for the courts to revert
to a fee system, it would probably be politically imprudent to do so. Cf. Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1970); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961). See also Good.
paster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and the Indigent's
Right to Free Access to the Courts, 56 Iowa L. REv. 223 (1970).
10. Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 57, 60 A.2d 577, 579 (Pa. 1949), describes the gen.
erally prevailing allocation of power:
Control of state finances rests with the legislature, subject only to constitutional
limitations (citation omitted). The function of the judiciary to administer justice
does not include the power to levy taxes in order to defray the necessary expenses
in connection herewith. It is the legislature which must supply such funds.
Id.
There is great variety in the specific wording of state constitutions with respect to
the taxing power. Indeed, the constitutions of four states-Connecticut, loma, Rhode
Island, and Vermont-do not contain any clause specifically establishing the government's
taxing power.
In practice, however, legislatures in all the states exercise the taxing power. If not
otherwise authorized, they may do so under the theory that the power of a state legis.
lature is plenary except as specifically restricted by constitution. Thus tile legislature
may exercise the power to tax because that power is not otherwise delegated and is not
forbidden to the legislature by the state's constitution. R. DtslIMAN, STATE Co -rNmTtmoNS:
TiiE SHAPE OF THE DOCUMENT (1960). For the provisions of specific constitutions see
LEGisLATIvE REFERExCE BuREAu, UNivERSrr OF HAWAII, MANUAL ON STATE CONSITu-
TIONAL PROVISIONs 233 (1950).
11. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAu, UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII, supra note 10, at 263; NA-
TIONAL M UNICIPAL LEAGUE, "MODEL STATE CoNsr UTIoN art. 703 (1963).
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essence a judicial arrogation of discretion conferred, for better or
worse, on the popularly-elected branches of government.'- Indeed,
the virtue of the doctrine seen by some of its supporters-that it takes
the problem of maintaining an adequate court system out of the realm
of public debate and political commitment-may also be viewed as
an essential vice. No important function of government can be main-
tained over the long run without public debate, political commitment,
and the exercise of community responsibility as expressed by bodies
dependent on popular assent.
Unless it is very substantially expanded, the doctrine of inherent
power could force court financing into an unworkably narrow frame-
work. This is perhaps the most serious practical difficulty with the
doctrine: In order to create a legal duty on the part of any govern-
ment agency to provide a service or facility, the item must be "indis-
pensable" to the functioning of the judicial system. The only service
that can be so regarded is the provision of judicial salaries. Courts can
function-indeed, they have functioned-with judges and nothing more.
Most constitutions recognize the indispensability of maintaining ju-
dicial salaries by forbidding any reductions during a judge's term.
But none of the cases invoking the inherent power doctrine have
involved an infringement on judicial pay. Moreover, under modern
conditions-with continuous inflation and steadily swelling dockets
-action to grant periodic salary increases and create new judgeships
seems more critical than merely maintaining the status quo. Yet no
advocate of inherent power would argue that judges can raise their
salaries or augment their numbers by writs of mandamus. Such actions,
although possibly indispensable to an effective judicial system, clearly
fall outside the doctrine's narrow framework. And that framework
also omits the vast apparatus of supporting staff and services which
are practically essential, if not literally indispensable, to a modern
court system.
The doctrine is too limited in another sense: It contradicts a funda-
mental principle of efficient budgeting, i.e., that any service or facility
should be regarded as replaceable by a functionally equivalent, less
expensive alternative. A court clerk should be regarded as equivalent
to an administrative assistant or a computer programmer, a court
reporter to a recording technician and typist, a staff of probation of-
ficers to field investigators and staff psychologists. The point is not
that all these substitutions, or any of them, should be made-but that
12. Cf. Brennan, Judicial Fiscal Independence, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 277 (1971).
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they should be objectively considered. An intelligent approach to
judicial financing requires some investigation of alternative means of
accomplishing essential tasks. But the focus of the inherent power
doctrine is solely on how to obtain funds and not at all on how to
use those funds in the most balanced, economical way. The doctrine
therefore invites the courts to frame their financial problems in the
least constructive fashion: in terms of traditional offices and proce-
dures, not current and future functional requirements; budget line
items, not the efficient use of financial resources; inherited levels of
financial support, not the service demands which they must meet;
the courts as an institution outside the political life of the community,
not as an expression of the community's ideas and ideals of justice.'3
This is not to say that the doctrine of inherent power is dead, or
empty, or that it should be discarded. When invoked with the au-
thority of the central appellate courts against an agency of local gov-
ernment to fund particular items of a judicial budget that the agency
is more or less specifically obliged to undenvrite, the doctrine is at
least an additional legal basis for a mandamus or comparable order.
These situations arise recurrently with regard to budget items whose
occurrence or size is difficult to project, e.g., unusually large amounts
for jury, grand jury and witness fees arising out of a big trial or special
investigation; funds required to pay attorneys' fees for an unprece-
dented number of criminal indigents; sums required for courthouse
security in a case involving sensation or political controversy. The
stidden necessity of meeting such requirements can most easily upset
the judicial budget of a rural county, where the unwonted expendi-
ture is perhaps also very much unwanted. In these circumstances, the
judicial mandate operates as a supplemental appropriation, leaving
it to the local government agency to work the expenditure into its
own budget revision.
But the doctrine, applied in this manner, is of modest practical
consequence, capable of dealing effectively with some small problems
but unable to solve the big ones. Indeed, because it employs consti-
tutional rhetoric in procuring the incidentals of office, the doctrine
diverts attention from the truly critical budgeting task facing the
courts: choosing priorities among goals and objectives, since there
will never be sufficient funding to do everything that might reason-
ably be thought necessary in an ideal system of justice.' 4
13. Cf. Hazard, Rationing Justice, 8 J. Lw & Eco.v. 1 (1965).
14. Id.
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II. Court Finance and Court Administration
The judiciary will always be subordinate to the legislature on sig-
nificant matters of finance. It is for the legislature to determine which
"essential services" the government will provide and to decide the
judiciary's share of the common financial shortage. Accepting these
political realities, and forsaking the mythology of judicial supremacy
and autonomy in financial matters, a court should see its financial
problems in a more general context that links budgeting to admin-
istration.
This perspective would suggest that the financial problems of the
courts are manifestations of their organizational and administrative
problems. The fact that they must make episodic forays in pursuit of
line item funds is evidence of their failure to anticipate and cope
with their workload, manpower and operational problems-the weak-
ness of their planning process. The fact that these initiatives are
directed against local government is evidence of the diffuse organiza-
tion of the judiciary and its dependency on the lowest common de-
nominator of local political support. The fact that the requests are
directed at specific line items, such as jury fees or secretarial salaries,
rather than overall organizational and administrative requirements,
is evidence that the courts generally do not conceptualize their re-
quirements in comprehensive terms.
In this perspective, court finance is simply the fiscal counterpart of
court administration. When a court system is administratively and
functionally integrated, the budget expresses the means by which the
various activities of the system are to be carried out. When a system
is not administratively integrated, its budget is a formal, but not
functional, document: It simply aggregates expenditures for activities
that are only nominally related to each other.
There are judicial systems which exhibit relatively strong admin-
istrative management with only a limited degree of budgetary unifi-
cation. The New Jersey system is a prime example. 1 Conversely, a
system may have a relatively loose administrative structure although
its financial operations are unified in a single budget. This appears
to be the case in Connecticut. The comparative efficiency of these
different arrangements can be determined only through intensive case
studies of court administration, which are now generally lacking.10
15. See Schwartz, The Unification and Centralization of The Administration of Jls-
tice, 51 JUDICATURE 337 (1968).
16. Cf. Booz, ALLEN & HAMILTON, CALIFORNIA LowEr COURT STUDY, in CALIFORNIA
JUDICIAL COUNCIL RErORT app. (1971).
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Under any system, a budget is neither a substitute for administration
nor a conclusive indication of administrative quality or achievement;
it is, however, an indication of the system's administrative potential.
In a system with a sufficiently integrated administrative structure,
a budgeting system is an indispensable aid in making management
decisions on the use of resources. First, it facilitates planning, since it
can be used as a schedule of projected operations expressed in fiscal
terms. Second, it permits efficient management of the resources that
the legislature has made available, avoiding unnecessary waste, and
fulfilling to the greatest extent possible the court's functional and
policy goals. Third, it gives a complete and understandable audit of
the use of the court's funds. If the budget performs these planning,
management and audit functions well, it can stimulate answers to
the central questions the courts should be asking: What are we trying
to do, and how should we be trying to do it? These answers, formulated
and stated in fiscal terms, may be used to prepare responsible and
defensible requests for legislative funding. Appropriation requests of
this nature simultaneously aid the legislature in discharging its con-
stitutional duty to finance the courts and the electorate in holding
the legislature accountable for that responsibility.
III. The Elements of Unitary Budgeting
Unitary budgeting, as implemented in seven states, 17 is a compre-
hensive system in which all judicial costs are funded by the state
through a single budget administered by the judicial branch. The
unified budget encompasses all operating expenditures of the court
system: salaries, services, equipment, supplies and capital improve-
ments. Such a system relies on state expenditures instead of fragmented
local appropriations. As the sole mechanism for allocating resources
throughout the entire judicial system, the unitary budget complements
other procedures for the central management of the state's courts.
Unitary budgeting thus represents a fundamental departure from
traditional court fiscal management. It locates in one central author-
ity the ultimate responsibility for planning, channeling, and auditing
17. The seven states are: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, North Carolina,
Rhode Island, and Vermont. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-11-8 (Supp. 1969); CoNS. GEN;.
STAT. ANN. § 51-9 (Supp. 1971); HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 32, § 601-02 (198); N.C. GE.
STAT. § 7A-300 (Supp. 1971); and R.I. GEN. L,-ws § 8-154 (1969). For a description of
court budgeting in Alaska and Vermont see U.S. ADVIsORV CotMIssIoN ON I'TEaIGOMNS-
MENTAL RF.LATIONS, supra note 1, at 206; and INSTITUTE OF JUDICAL ADMINISnATAION.
supra note 3, at 51. See also VT. STAT. ANN. § 21 (1972); Vcnmont creates the post of
court administrator but leaves his duties to be defined by the judiciary.
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all judicial expenditures within a state. Under unitary budgeting
statutes, authority in court fiscal matters accompanies ultimate ad-
ministrative authority in the court system. The preparation of a con-
solidated budget is entrusted to the administrative head of the judicial
department; the chief justice may assume the task or designate the
chief court administrator to do so.' 8
Budget preparation will include auditing past expenditures, ob-
taining estimates of current financial needs from each court within
the state, preparing estimates of forthcoming operations, and review-
ing and revising these budgetary proposals. A final budget is thus the
product of a central administration, informed by the constituent units
of the judicial system. The central administrative head presents the
budget to the appropriate state legislative committee for consideration,
before which he serves as the principal advocate for the entire court
system.
In a literal sense the resulting budget is a "document containing
words and figures which proposes expenditures for certain items and
purposes.""' But it is more-it is an instrument of administration:
In the most general definition, budgeting is concerned with
the translation of financial resources into human purposes. A
budget, therefore, may be characterized as a series of goals with
price tags attached. Since funds are limited and have to be di-
vided in one way or another, the budget becomes a mechanism
for making choices among alternative expenditures. When the
choices are coordinated as to achieve desired goals, a budget may
be called a plan. Should it include a detailed specification of how
its objectives are to be achieved, a budget may serve as a plan of
work for those who assume the task of implementing it. If empha-
sis is placed on achieving the most policy returns for a given sum
of money, or on obtaining the desired objectives at the lowest cost,
a budget may become an instrument for insuring efficiency.20
Thus, unitary budgeting contrasts vividly with traditional methods
of court finance, which involve substantial local funding, the deriva-
tion of revenues from a multiplicity of sources, and inflexible con-
nection with an expenditure schedule that is only nominally a budget.
Under traditional methods of court finance, the sum of court costs
18. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-11-8 (Supp. 1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-9 (Stpp,
1971); HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 32, § 601-02 (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-300 (Supp. 1971);
and R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-15-4 (1969).
19. A. WILDAVSKY, TIlE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROcESS 1 (1964).
20. Id. at 1-2.
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throughout the state appears in no one budget and is therefore subject
to no overall administrative control. Historically, court financial man-
agement has been fragmented, reflecting the division of financial
responsibility between state, county and municipal governments. The
funding of appellate courts has been the responsibility of the state
government. At present, every state centrally finances all the expenses
of its highest court, and the costs of intermediate appellate courts are
fully met by 17 of the 20 states which have them.*'- But at tile trial
court level, counties bear the major fiscal burden.22 In half of the
states autonomous local governments control at least two-thirds of
the expenditures of the entire court system. 2a In such states, there
may be budgetary authorities in addition to the counties;24 and there
is little systematic coordination of authority or responsibility among
them.
In some states, this fragmentation is compounded within individual
counties where court services are funded through a multiplicity of
non-judicial budgets as well as through the judicial budget.-3 In
these counties, there may be one budget (not administered by the
judiciary) for the maintenance of court buildings, a separate non-
judicial budget for the county clerk's office, and yet another for
probation officers. Each budget is the product of a separate admin-
istrative process. And although each budget channels funds into the
same court system, it does so without any overall control or direction.
Even where states have assumed part of the expenses of the trial
courts, they have usually failed to affect the administrative void. Most
states now contribute some portion of the salaries of trial court per-
sonnel,2 c6 but the vast majority of these have not prescribed a uniform
budgetary format and procedure.2 Furthermore, although state sub-
sidies of this kind may have released local funds for the salaries of
other court personnel, few states have established a central agency
for supervising local budgetary procedures.28 The result is minimal
central administrative control at the trial court level.
21. U.S. ADvIsoRY CoMMIssIoN ON INTERGOVM'.NME.N,,TAL RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 109.
22. Id. at 108.
23. U.S. LXW ENFORCEMENT AssiS-rANcc ADMINIMIRATION, & U.S. BUREAU OF TH1E CFNSUS,
EXPENDrTURE AND EM'LOY. tNT DATA FOR IIIE CRIMINAL JUS1tC" S sm.%t 1968.69, Table
No. 5 (1971).
24. See, e.g., Com.MrrTEE ON THE STATE CoNsrrrurmoN. Nw Yom STATE BAit A s N, supra
note 2, at 5-6.
25. INSTIUTE OF JUDICIAL AD.MINISTATION, supra note 3, at 5-6.
26. Id. at 30.
27. Id. at 51.
28. rd.
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IV. Administrative Implications of Unitary Budgeting
Unitary budgeting offers not only a more orderly financial pro-
cedure for the courts but also the possibility of improved court man-
agement. Its advantages may be summarized as follows:
(1) Unitary budgeting promotes planning in judicial administration;
(2) It permits a more equitable distribution of judicial services with-
in a state;
(3) It facilitates uniformity in job classification of judicial employees;
(4) It provides a mechanism for administration of the system.
A. Planning
The courts, like any other institution, must change to meet the
needs of the public. Planning for such change is an essential part of
effective judicial administration.
Traditional budgeting severely limits the accuracy and efficacy of
planning by the courts. A precise statement of the expenditures of
the state judicial system's many constituent elements is often impos-
sible to obtain.29 Costs may be hidden and needs overlooked.
Even where needs are recognized, moreover, the implementation
of change is encumbered. In New York, for example, there are more
than 60 separate appropriating bodies, each with its own budget,
providing funds for the courts.30 Any reform is certain to involve a
significant number of these agencies, yet in the absence of any overall
scheme for allocating ultimate responsibility each fiscal authority is
free to cooperate, or not cooperate, as it chooses. This makes efficient
distribution of judicial resources nearly impossible. A local authority
can simply refuse to upgrade or equalize services or to eliminate re-
dundant expenditures. Without a central budgeting mechanism, the
implementation of reform is thus largely a matter of optimistic ex-
hortation.
B. Distribution of Judicial Services
The quality of justice a person receives should not depend on his
residence.31 Yet in many states court services are neither equal nor
uniformly adequate. Some courts are overstaffed; others, understaffed.
29. Id. at 4.
30. COMMITrEE ON THE STATE CONSTITUTION, NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS'N, supra note 2,
at 5-6.
31. A similar concern with disparate service levels has recently been evinced regardlng
public education. See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971).
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Some judges have adequate assistance; others, little or none.32 Even
where localities do provide the same nominal judicial services, their
quality may differ because of disparate salary levels or hiring practices.
And the quality of court services varies dramatically according to the
locality's ability to pay. Some jurisdictions simply cannot afford the
full panoply of judicial and judicially related services without cur-
tailing other social services.33
Unitary budgeting offers the prospect of greater uniformity of ju-
dicial services by tapping a state-wide tax base.34 Moreover, it can
greatly facilitate planning for grant and contract resources, particularly
under federal programs such as those of the Law Enforcement Assist-
ance Administration and the Bureau of Highway Safety. It may also
enable localities to use locally raised revenues presently committed
to the judiciary for other local services. States might thereby reduce
present aid to local governments for non-judicial services3 5 or allocate
the savings to the judicial districts burdened with poorer services or
heavier caseloads.
C. Personnel Systems
Within local government, the courts are but one of many county
and municipal services to be staffed, in direct competition with such
services for funding. Since judicial services do not touch most voters
as directly as non-judicial onis (such as schools, streets, police, and
sanitation control) local appropriating bodies are ordinarily more
sympathetic to the needs of the latter. Adequate court funding, there-
fore, may depend on the degree to which appropriations for the trial
courts can be made politically attractive.
Local financing thus thrusts the courts into local politics. This may
explain why in many states patronage plays an important role in the
selection of trial court employees and the determination of their
number.3 6 Patronage in turn blocks the development of uniform per-
32. CONSTITUTIONAL REvIsioN CoMNirrTxr, CrTIzENs UNIoN or Mte CITY OF NLew Yonx,
supra note 2, at 2.
33. Consider, for example, the experience of the state of Colorado. In 1965, the state
adopted an extensive program of court reorganization, implementation of which required
increases of 10 to 20 per cent in the amount of local tax revenues to be spent on
the judiciary. As a result, a number of counties had to exercise tight budgetary control
over other functions financed from general funds in order to avoid exceeding the statutory
general fund mill levy limit. Some counties even had to cut back on non-judicial county
functions. See GovERioR's LOCALL AFFAIRS STUDY COMMI.nSSION, supra note 2. at 2.
34. CONSTITUTIONAL RaEvisiox Co.Mr~rEE, CtTIZENS UNION OF TIlE Crry OF NEA' Yom.,
supra note 2, at 3.
35. R. Ehrlich, Unified Judicial Budget 17, 1966 (unpublished paper on file with the
Institute of Judicial Administration, New York).
36. Cf. GovERoR's LOCAL AFFAIRS STUDY Co.,IMISsION, supra note 2, at 94.
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sonnel standards, since courts are staffed according to local political
considerations rather than occupational proficiency.
Assumption of substantially all court costs by the state under a
unitary budget would eliminate this patronage and would enable
the central judicial administration to develop a uniform job classi-
fication scheme. 3T
D. Unified Judicial System and Unitary Budgeting
In the final analysis, the goal of an administratively unified judicial
system underlies the call for unitary budgeting. Viewed from a state-
wide perspective, such a system would permit formulation of priorities,
comparison of alternatives, and the allocation of resources in accord-
ance with objectives. Unitary budgeting affords the possibility of ef-
ficient administration necessary to create alternatives, choose among
them, and implement these choices. Unitary budgeting is thus a meth-
od for transforming the presently fragmented judicial system, which
reacts to events by "making do," into a unified system that anticipates
and copes with change.
V. Limitations of Unitary Budgeting
Unitary budgeting will not, however, solve all the administrative
problems of the courts, and it is important to recognize its limitations.
A. Problems of Structural Definition
While unitary budgeting promotes planning of the total expendi-
tures of a judicial system, it cannot determine which agencies and
services comprise the "judicial system." Some prior decision must be
made as to which functions and services, and consequently which
expenditures, are to be administered by the judicial system. Is the
probation department part of the courts? The juvenile detention cen-
ters? Bailiffs and constables? Where a single county clerk's office
performs the functions of the clerk of the court, what part of that
office's expenditures should be allocated to the judicial system? Very
difficult problems of management and coordination can follow the
definition of these boundaries, particularly as regards the courts' auxil-
iary and support services. If these services are placed outside the court
system's administrative domain (as delimited by its budget) there is
37. Id.
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still the problem of coordinating them with the courts. If they are
placed within the judicial domain, there is the problem of running
them well in a branch of government which is not organized with ad-
ministrative considerations primarily in mind. In either case, a unitary
budget will neither produce complete information on which manage-
ment comparisons may be made, nor guarantee the public a complete
picture of the cost of its courts.
A second definitional problem arises over job classification and
salary structures for judicial personnel. With the exception of the
judges in a few states, judicial personnel do not move from court to
court. Thus, even a financially integrated system will remain com-
partmentalized to the extent that the local courthouse is still essen-
tially a unique and virtually autonomous unit in terms of its staff.
The nature of the work of any staff person will obviously depend on
four factors: the amount of business, the number of other staff per-
sonnel, the individual's ability, and the organization of his workplace
and workflow. These various factors increase the difficulty of stand-
ardizing job categories. In the absence of authoritative data, advocates
will make a special case for the peculiarities of their particular situ-
ations. The effectiveness of such partisanship should decline over
time as unification is implemented and standardization truly takes
hold. Initially, however, parochialism may influence not only person-
nel categorization but also general decisions concerning assignment
of court resources to local areas.
Another difficulty arises from the fact that unitary budgeting implies
substantial uniformity in procedure and court services throughout the
state. It may therefore discourage local initiative in providing sup-
porting services at a level above that regarded by the state as mini-
mally sufficient. To reduce this tendency, a state employing unitary
budgeting might provide for cost-sharing with localities that estab-
lish supplemental court services.
Finally, there is the problem of defining the unit of the judicial
system that will be unitarily budgeted. The ordinarily preferable unit
is the state. In most circumstances, as a matter of both tradition
and political reality, the state is the proper unit for unitary budg-
eting. It has a population of manageable size, balanced distribu-
tion, and strong common interests that create an identity and allow
for effective communication. But some states may not fit this general
description. They may include several more or less politically autono-
mous and geographically distinct constituent units-as in states con-
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taining both large rural areas and a few major urban centers. More-
over, some states may conclude that it is simply impractical for them
to take over full funding of the court system at any given time. In
these circumstances, the financial base of the court system, especially
the trial court system, would have to remain in local government. The
system should reflect this fact by having the principally responsible
unit of local government, usually the county, create a unified budget
for the court it is supporting. Thus, while defining the proper unit
for unification is a crucial question, it must be resolved for each state
in light of the specific characteristics of its situation.
B. Political Factors of Unitary Budgeting
No budgeting system is immune from the fundamental debate over
who gets what, i.e, politics. Once a unified budget has been established,
the influence of political pressure on administrative policymaking in
the courts should diminish. But at the same time, the internalized
bureaucratic politics within the judicial system will no doubt in-
crease. Where a judge previously sought to provide for the needs of
his court by influencing a local county supervisor or town chairman,
he will now have to do so by influencing the court administrator, chief
justice, or planning committee of his fellow judges. This, in turn,
implies a change in the types of persuasion that will prove influential,
with greater weight given to professional and administratively rational
considerations. It also implies that a different type of judge will
prove more successful in the pulling and hauling of resource alloca-
tion. Again, this change would seem to favor those who talk policy
and programs, as opposed to those who talk folkways.
A remote danger in unitary budgeting, but one which cannot be
ignored, is that the judicial system will take the inherent power doc-
trine seriously and try to secure its appropriations by mandamus. At
this level, the legislature would find its vital interests and prerogatives
threatened, and would very likely ignore whatever order a court might
issue. The ultimate outcome of such a conflict is impossible to predict;
but certainly it would discredit both branches of government and
embarrass judicial financing for some time.
A more likely if less obvious danger in unitary budgeting is its prob-
able tendency toward allocating judicial services among localities on
a formula of more or less strict mathematical equality. Such formal
equality will be achieved only by ignoring other vital considerations.
If differences of need and condition are recognized, service differen-
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tials between localities will and should continue to exist. The goal
must be sufficiency, not equality of insufficiency. Achieving this goal
will require difficult decisions in placing priorities on varying prob-
lems and locations. It will certainly entail some subsidization of poor
localities by more affluent ones, with all the difficulties entailed by
this kind of redistribution. Such decisions should be informed and
careful. Unitary budgeting can help them be more so, but it cannot
foreclose the possibilities of error, imprudence, or bias.
VI. Conclusion
There are two related respects in which unitary budgeting should
be considered and evaluated. The first is as an element of a larger
program of administrative reform. In this respect, unitary budgeting
can facilitate and monitor reforms, and in that way, further them.
The second is as an important reform in itself. Unitary budgeting
cannot, in and of itself, secure the revenue necessary for the courts,
as advocates of the doctrine of inherent power contend their own
theory can. But it is clearly superior to any traditional system of court
finance as a mechanism of managing, allocating, and planning. It can
make possible a rational, integrated ordering of state-wide priorities,
in coping with problems that would otherwise be dealt with more
or less fortuitously through many uncoordinated local decisions. At
a time when the court systems of the country are under severe pressure
to do their job better, these are substantial attractions.
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